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Senior Research Staff on International Communism

TITLE: Suggestions for Improving the Position of the
United States in the Face of the Communist
Challenge

FOREWORD

This study was prepared in response to a request for contributions on the title subject, for consideration by DCI and OCB. It consists of two parts: a speculative appreciation of the world situation, and proposals for policy and action. It will be apparent that only a small part, if any, of the latter can be regarded as "new ideas." Indeed, many are simply calls for intensification of established programs and policies. Nevertheless, it seemed worth while to present this wide diversity of suggestions as an organic whole in order to stress the interrelation of all parts of our action in the struggle against Communism.

Although the bulk of the suggestions are derived from the work of the Senior Research Staff over the past two years and are concurred in by all members of the staff, a number have been the subject of dissent, which is noted in an Appendix.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE POSITION
OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE FACE OF THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE

Introduction

In their response to the challenge of world Communism, foreign and domestic policy must be integral. We cannot effectively champion noble causes abroad without addressing ourselves to the shortcomings of our own society. We cannot assume leadership without maintaining the required base of power: military, economic, political and moral.

The formulation of foreign policy is integral with the estimate on which it is based. Accordingly we have constructed this paper within a frame of speculative judgments which we have developed in previous research studies. These are in part at variance with certain official positions, not so much in specifics as in a more somber coloring which emerges from our general projection of the dynamics of Communism.

To clarify the reasoning behind our suggestions, it may be useful to summarize our appreciation of the situation (for greater detail see SRS-6 - The Status and Prospects of World Communism: The Dialectic of Crisis and Stabilization - 16 September 1957).

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Speculative Appreciation of the World Situation

I. The Communist Challenge

A. Communism as a Force

Communism is a "secular religion" and has the world-conquering dynamics of a "twentieth century Islam."

Its expanding force derives in large measure from its conscious adoption of a dialectic principle of historic process which we have described under the triad: stability-crisis-stability (in Marxist jargon: thesis-antithesis-synthesis).

It follows that the repeated upheavals of world Communism - quite properly identified by non-Communists as "crises" - are the very motive force of its strength. Put in obverse terms: Communism will not "mellow," "erode" or "disintegrate," merely as a result of internal "stresses and strains."

B. The Role of the Soviet Union as the Fountainhead of World Communism

In general we feel that the strength of the Soviet Union as the head of International Communism is still appraised too low, because it is not fully comprehended. This does not apply to the military field, which will not be discussed here.

1. Political and Social

We believe that over the next 10-15 years the following judgments will prove valid:

a. The Communist leadership will remain strong, probably in the hands of Khrushchev or of an orderly succession.

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b. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will remain unchallenged in its control of every aspect of Soviet life, and it will probably achieve an increasing harmony with the aspirations of the people.

c. The rapid advance of higher education in the USSR will go on, not only to new heights in the scientific and technical fields, but to a remarkable development of intelligent citizens. The current imbalance is not as extreme as is often painted in this country. When its initial goals of providing a base for the economic and military strength of the country have been achieved, Soviet education may shift the stress to the social sciences and to the humanities, which even now are not neglected. Unforeseeable developments may occur, a "socialist Renaissance" of art, letters, music, philosophy, etc. No one can deny that the talent is there.

d. This educational process will not diminish the dynamics of Soviet Communism, indeed, may increase them. The Communist Party and its leaders will probably display increasing flexibility in imposing discipline on the intellectuals and adjusting to a growth of the critical spirit and awareness of the non-Communist world. From this may emerge a more humane and cultured society, as the Communists claim, but it will probably also be better able to wage "peaceful competition" with the Free World.

e. Soviet patriotism, coupled with the ideology of Communism, will further increase the might of the USSR. Many Soviet citizens are imbued with a powerful messianic urge, a sense of a still unfolding frontier, and a conviction that the resources, human and physical, of their land, are only beginning to be explored. The Great Russians, and their lesser Slavic brothers, in the name first of Tsarist imperialism, and later of

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Soviet "patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism" have undertaken a vast work of colonization, which they regard, not without color of plausibility, as one of uplift and development. Without denying that Great Russian chauvinism still exists, the Soviet leaders maintain that they are making strides to the resolution of their own "melting pot" problem.

2. Economic

In our opinion most estimates of future Soviet economic production are too low, being based on rather conservative projections of existing trends. They do not, in our judgment, attribute sufficient weight to cumulative or aggregative factors, which may in 10 to 15 years achieve a "snowball effect," making our present projections seem as inadequate as were those of Soviet nuclear potential in the early post-war period. These factors include:

- a. The fanatic determination of the leaders to catch up with the US "in an historically short period"; we should not underestimate the infectious potential of this slogan in the USSR and abroad.
- b. The unremitting development of the heavy industry base which may eventually be crowned by a much higher superstructure of light industry than we now consider achievable.
- c. The potential of automation and other radical technological advances.
- d. Soviet genius in broad project planning, which has been demonstrated by Sputniks, but has far wider implications.
- e. The current reappraisal of economic theory and practice, which is boldly scrutinizing Marx-

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ist dogma on price, value, market, cost, etc.: Soviet economists are showing unexpected open-mindedness toward lessons learned from the capitalist system.

f. Flexibility of planning, exemplified in the industrial reorganization and decentralization.

g. The growing trend of key party leaders to become expert in industrial management through both technological study and direct experience.

h. The increase of harmony between the management and the party elites, especially through career rotation.

i. The prospect that the wage and pension structure, and indeed the whole incentive basis of the economy, will be rationalized.

j. The likelihood of great strides in the organization, management and technology of agriculture; large quantities of manpower may be released for industrial production; the "virgin lands" gamble may make its peace with the meteorological law of averages, despite this year's defeat.

k. The prospect of rapid progress in housing, through the development of gigantic construction machinery (one was recently reported which can construct a five-story apartment house in a single process with a great saving in manpower; similar claims are made for earth moving machinery).

C. International Communism

The personal triumph of Khrushchev and the proceedings of the 40th Anniversary Celebration at Moscow suggest

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that International Communism is more powerful than ever.

1. Moscow's leadership has been reaffirmed, with China taking a secondary position. Flexibility has been displayed toward satellite parties, allowing them within limits to follow their national courses and to determine the relative danger of "revisionism" and "dogmatism." A "Socialist Commonwealth" has been prefigured which, in time, might prove a workable method of coping with "polycentrism" and of attracting socialist forces outside the present Bloc.

2. Soviet diplomacy confronts a number of promising situations, especially in the underdeveloped areas. It sees crisis areas throughout the globe in which it can exercise an aggressive policy under the mantle of nuclear deterrence. Whether Khrushchev himself is responsible or whether it springs from increasing maturity of the foreign service elements of Party and State, Soviet diplomacy has greatly advanced the new "style" which emerged after the death of Stalin.

3. The Bloc's attainment of an industrial position permitting substantial export of capital, as well as military, goods has challenged the previous monopoly of the United States and the industrial powers of Europe in one of the most effective fields of modern diplomacy.

4. The claim that Communism can triumph by peaceful, parliamentary means has increased the tactical flexibility of the Free World CPs; Indonesia is only the most striking example of the potential which this tactic holds.

5. "Peoples' diplomacy, " International Fronts and quasi-governmental activities such as the Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo have become a powerful adjunct of official diplomacy.

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6. The worldwide subversive, illegal apparat, though tactically reduced in emphasis, still works in harmony with Moscow's strategic plan.

II. The Free World Response

The estimate of Communist strength which we have presented above would induce a mood of pessimism, if accepted by itself. On the other hand, a review of United States and Free World strength presents a number of reassuring considerations. These will be summarized briefly as a prelude to outlining a program of action with which the United States could hope to improve its world position.

A. The United Nations is an instrument whose charter enshrines the basic ideals of the Free World and which has great potential for maintaining peace. The UN provides a framework within which regional groupings can take shape, eventually easing the tensions of bi-polarity.

B. The productive capacity of the NATO countries is such that they can maintain a high level of military preparedness, internal prosperity and capacity for investment in underdeveloped areas. The United States can set the lead for these advanced nations which are at present engulfed in anxiety and uncertainty of purpose.

C. The United States enjoys a solid base of prestige, admiration and friendship which has not been undermined by recent Soviet successes. It can maintain this base through a flexible combination of wise unilateral action and of co-operation with NATO and its other allies, as well as the United Nations.

D. The people of the United States have ample strength to meet the Communist challenge. Their dignity, generosity,

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discipline and spirit of sacrifice need only be roused by words and deeds of enlightened leadership. We believe most Americans would now accept the propositions that this country must:

1. Maintain the position of leadership in the Free World;
2. Address itself to the shortcomings of its social system, notably to the racial problem; we believe that in the next 10 to 15 years sufficient progress will be made to remove the stigma which the Communists now so effectively exploit;
3. Have confidence in its productive capacity, in order to insure the stability of its economy against disturbing internal fluctuations and to contribute to the development of less fortunate areas;
4. Maintain a high level of military preparedness, and develop the necessary weapons to insure our security, regardless of cost;
5. Greatly increase the level of education and training, not only in the technical and scientific fields, but in all branches of learning, and in intellectual broadening;
6. Increase the flexibility, imagination and resourcefulness of its foreign policy, and participate more extensively in international undertakings.

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Proposals for Policy and Action

Introduction

Many of these proposals refer to programs which are already under way, or at least are being considered. We have felt it desirable to include them, even at the risk of being gratuitous, since, in our opinion, the total challenge of Communism demands a total response. This is not an undertaking where easy or dramatic progress can be made. Rather, as will be apparent in the variety of suggestions below, slow and frequently indirect steps must be taken without full knowledge of the destination. What we propose is not a revolutionary change of strategy, though some of the tactical modifications would be drastic. Rather, we urge a program beginning in self-appraisal, centering in a fresh estimate of our present adversary, and ending in a new vision of a world comity of nations.

I. Foreign Policy - Basic Principles and Programs

A. The Paramountcy of Peace

1. The US must recapture from the Soviet Union the world advocacy of peace. The dedication to peace of the people of the United States is deep; we know this, and so does most of the world, including the Russians. But we have been maneuvered by the Kremlin into a seemingly equivocal position. This cannot be rectified by protestation, but requires certain actions.

2. The United States should seek to establish a powerful institutional framework for the advocacy of peace. It is not suggested that we set up a Free World Peace Council as an answer to the Communist WPC - though such a step may prove advisable - but we might do much to strength-

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en and coordinate the work of the Quakers, the Carnegie Peace Foundation, and others. We should hope that an American will again be honored by the Nobel Peace Prize in the near future. (More citizens of the US have been so honored than of any other country; the last was General Marshall in 1953).

3. We must purge ourselves of all suspicion of harboring designs of a preventive war. Deeply as we are convinced of our purely defensive posture, we are not equally convincing to all other peoples. There has been too much public toying with the idea that perhaps we should strike first. The thought that charged H-bombs are in the air is far from reassuring to millions of Europeans.

4. We should take seriously the Soviet fear of military encirclement. It is nearly impossible for us, who have never been invaded, to grasp the sensitivity of Nikita Khrushchev and millions of Russians concerning the threat of German militarization. Nor is it easy for us to understand their active fear of the American bases which ring their land.

5. We should publicly credit the government of the Soviet Union with having no intention of initiating major war and should insist that it do likewise with us. A plausible case can be made that Soviet strategy since the end of World War II has been basically defensive. It is doubtful that the Russians have any desire to achieve world domination by holocaust. Put simply, if they had had at any time during the past ten years the capability of wiping out the United States with relative impunity, it is very unlikely that they would have done so. They are not that inhuman. Moreover, they are confident that they can bring about the socialization of the world, including the US, by means other than general war.

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6. On the other hand we should not credit the USSR with generally benign or peaceful motives. The Communist leaders are certainly not solicitous for human life where their power objectives are at stake. Following Lenin, they have proclaimed that violence will be used, if peaceful methods do not suffice to bring about "socialist" revolution. We should not only anticipate the possibility of limited wars and be prepared for them; we should daily project our watchfulness into every potential trouble spot on the globe. For example, we should have a plan for Indonesia, in case a Communist coup occurs, and is supported with arms, food, and even "volunteers" from China or the USSR. We should make up our minds whether we would be willing to carry out such a plan, and indicate our intentions unmistakably to the Kremlin and to our allies. Otherwise, we may be sure that another Berlin, another Korea will take place somewhere.

7. We should anticipate that lesser countries, under the mantle of nuclear stalemate, will frequently resort to dangerous and even reckless courses. This form of "nuclear lawlessness" will at times be especially provocative, since it will often enlist Soviet support or receive it unasked. Even minor disputes will thus be invested with the awesome potentiality of Armageddon.

B. Disarmament

The defense of peace requires a halt to the armaments race. The great majority of mankind recognize that the drive for an eternally receding parity of destruction has become an obsessive nightmare. The practical problem is how to halt this madness which can only end "on the beach."

1. We must first recognize that the whole world is party to the disarmament program. This is not a unique affair of the two super-powers or of the third and fourth

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and potentially n'th nuclear powers. Natural law affirms that the entire community of mankind, living and unborn, have their rights to peace, which all must defend.

2. For this reason we should anchor our disarmament negotiations in the United Nations. It is not sufficient to say that 82 nations cannot negotiate. Most of them have little to renounce in the field of force, but their moral right to demand that others make such renunciation is everywhere the same.

3. We should accept the challenge of the USSR to call for a special session of the UN General Assembly to deal with disarmament. We have more to gain from this step than the Russians, and they know it, but they are gambling boldly on our established pattern of refusal and our procedural rigidity. We would stand to win overwhelming support for the principle of inspection, which the Russians would probably still resist or refuse. In such event, the moral, or at least the propaganda position would be reversed. The least that could be gained from this maneuver would be to educate the smaller nations in the difficulty of the problem.

4. We should be prepared to accept a phased cutback of nuclear stockpiles and other weapons of mass destruction to any point of parity with the USSR which can be guaranteed by inspection. This would leave NATO and our other alliances at a point of comparative disadvantage toward the Bloc in conventional armament. Therefore, we must be prepared in this field to build our strength up to the safety point, pending further progress in disarmament. This would entail major economic sacrifice, but, if the western allies, with triple the production of the Bloc, did not assume that burden, they would deservedly forfeit their right of leadership in the Free World. We should press NATO not to allow this to happen.

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5. As a first step, the US should unilaterally stop testing nuclear weapons for a limited period and call on the USSR to do likewise. It should ask the UN to establish an agency for controlling this process.

6. We should maintain a flexible position with respect to nuclear missiles for Western Europe. There is abundant evidence that the peoples and governments of NATO are having sober second thoughts on this subject. The impact of more than a year of Soviet nuclear diplomacy has been cumulative, and the increasing skill with which this course is being pursued should not be underestimated. We do not know what the NATO countries will decide, and we should be prepared to accept their decisions with understanding and composure. This would be particularly necessary if a strong move should develop for mutual withdrawal of troops or thinning out of armaments in Central Europe.

7. We should also maintain a flexible position with respect to our overseas bases. We must recognize and admit when they have reached the point of military or political untenability, and seek to extract from their abandonment any possible negotiating and propaganda advantages.

8. In sum, we should explore all the current proposals of the USSR with at least the public appearance of receptivity.

C. Attitudes toward "Peaceful Competition" and the "Cold War"

Nikita Khrushchev has declared repeatedly that the era of absolute nuclear deterrence has arrived and that it will be permanent, barring a disarmament agreement. Under these circumstances, he insists, "peaceful coexistence" is mandatory. This is hard to deny. The question

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for us is on what terms we accept and carry out this epochal conflict.

1. We must begin by enquiring what will be the world power situation in the future. The pattern which has dominated the post-war period has been one of polarization between the US and the USSR. Soviet propaganda in one of its tactics asserts that this is still the situation. On the other hand, it speaks of a "Commonwealth of Socialist Nations," of a "great zone of peace" and of a fracturing of the capitalist "camp." From the Communist viewpoint, there is no inconsistency in demanding that the forum of international debate be both a summit meeting of the US and the USSR and a special session of the General Assembly of the UN, not to mention other proposals.

2. We must keep our policy flexible, on the assumption that bi-polarization will probably not endure. The preeminence of the two "superpowers" is increasingly subject to challenge. In the Free World, regional groupings may be expected to emerge. Western Europe under the Common Market and free trade area will be a match for the USSR and even perhaps for the US; "interdependence" is the watchword. On the Communist side, "polycentrism," held in check by the 12-Party Moscow Declaration, will challenge the skill in leadership of the Kremlin; China will not always be acquiescent to Moscow's hegemony. The under-developed regions will coalesce in groupings as yet unpredictable.

3. We should continue, as we have done, to promote regional developments within the UN system. The need for US support is strongest in the under-developed areas. Here, we should work for the establishment of regional development programs, scientific and technical institutes, health and welfare programs. These will be considered more specifically under topical headings below.

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4. The tone and style of our diplomacy should be calculated to convince world opinion that we are not the perpetrators of the cold war. We will be faced with grave provocation by the Communists: acts of incitement brazenly labeled as defense against war-mongering imperialism. These we must expose, vigorously but without counter-provocation. Many uncommitted governments and peoples are inwardly persuaded of our decency and toleration, but need a continuing demonstration thereof. We should provide them with concrete examples of these virtues and avoid generalized expressions of moral righteousness.

5. We might do well to adopt explicitly the concept of "peaceful coexistence." It is true that the term is of doubtful rigor and, in any case, conceals the determination to wage a remorseless struggle. Nevertheless, if by admitting it to our public parlance, we could blunt it as a Communist weapon, the action might be worthwhile.

6. We might also do well to espouse the "Panja Shila" or "five principles." These are certainly not exceptionable in themselves. They were formulated by Burmese Premier U Nu, one of the South Asian neutrals whom we respect and woo. The fact that the "Panja Shila" have been propagated ad nauseam by the Communists does not mean that we should spurn them. Rather, we should demand that the USSR act in accordance with them.

7. We should adopt a more equable attitude toward "neutralism." We should cease to identify political non-alignment with moral indifference. Even when neutrality goes "against" us, as in the case of Asian discrimination between Soviet and western nuclear tests, we should not display annoyance but labor to correct the unfairness by reasoning and persuasion.

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8. We should continue our endeavors to devitalize the charge of "imperialism" and "colonialism." This is at present the most insidious Communist weapon. The fact that the USSR is in some ways the greatest "imperialist" power must of course be constantly turned against it, but more than tu quoque is required. The US cannot compete with the irresponsible Soviet Union in a public relations contest over the few remaining situations where there is still reality in great-power control of backward countries. We can, however, work for practical settlements between contending interests - as we have often tried to do - and establish at least our own reputation for competence, industry and fair dealings. The United Nations can play a considerable role in this process.

9. We should develop a workable doctrine of nationalism for newly liberated countries. There is of course an abundance of information on the history of nationalism, but the application of this to contemporary and future problems needs more extensive research. It might be advisable to encourage a privately sponsored study project to investigate the phenomenon throughout the world. Its findings would illuminate both the dangerous and the constructive features of nationalism. They might show that uncontrolled nationalism, even in mature and stable countries, has frequently led to situations of hate-charged emotionalism, issuing in war. At the same time, they could point the way to the development of sound patriotism, as opposed to "proletarian internationalism," and of the rich cultural heritages of many economically backward countries.

D. Negotiations

1. By concrete measures we must convince the Free World opinion - including our own - that we genuinely desire to negotiate with the USSR. This is not to imply that our position has been disingenuous, but merely to state that

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it has failed to carry conviction in many quarters. By our emphasis on "deeds not words", on the inherent "untrustworthiness of the Russians," and on the inacceptability of their procedural maneuvers, we have established a certain impression that we perhaps do not want to negotiate at all.

2. At the same time we must educate Free World opinion to accept the fact that a general settlement is not possible in the near future. We must point out the sheer inacceptability of Khrushchev's demand for an agreement of the two super-powers on the basis of the status quo. Similarly, we should patiently explain the logic of our position that disarmament and political settlements are not radically separable. Finally, we should operate on the principle that limited and partial agreements are all that can be expected at this time, and that they can best be approached through conventional diplomatic channels, e. g. U. S. Ambassador Moscow and the senior echelons of the Soviet Foreign office, or US-Soviet ambassadors at one or more key foreign posts. It would be interesting to see whether such an approach, made with a stipulation of secrecy, would be rebuffed or abused by the Kremlin.

3. In the meantime we might weigh the step of inviting Bulganin and Khrushchev to Washington some time in 1958. This could be done on the same basis as the visit of Nehru, i. e. a personal visit to the President and to the people of the United States, but not an official negotiation between governments.

II. Foreign Policy - Action Programs Directed toward Strengthening the Free World

This section will set forth recommendations for promoting the strength of the Free World, in fields other than military. It places its emphasis on positive, construc-

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tive programs rather than on negative, resistant anti-Communism.

A. Organizational Considerations

The great strength of International Communism lies in its combination of undeviating ideology with powerful organization. The Free World may envy the disciplined militant cadres of Marxists, and wish that it could create some counterpart to propagate its own cause. SRS has speculated extensively on the advisability of some such move without arriving at firm conclusions. Tentatively we advance the following general suggestions:

1. The US should strive to develop a large group of dedicated experts in all aspects of foreign activity. This should be a broad campaign enlisting the support of colleges, foundations, business firms and professional organizations. It might be centralized at the government level in a special staff of the NSC or the OCB. Covert agencies should play an important role in selection and training. Something of the British flexibility in utilizing private individuals and organizations as "lay ambassadors" might be developed.

2. We should cultivate the concept of career service abroad as a major form of national service. Whether governmental or unofficial, the career of service overseas should be both broadened and specialized. Preparation should begin in the schools, above all with emphasis on language and area knowledge. (A good example of this type of training is the College for Representation Abroad, Utrecht, Holland, financed by Dutch commercial interests: Christian Science Monitor, 13 January 1958, p. 12). Whether engineer or diplomat, each American in this field should be imbued with our "public philosophy" and taught the art of propagating it. Embassies and other government

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posts abroad should serve as bases for aiding, supporting, monitoring and stimulating everything that private Americans do, but should not attempt to exercise direct control.

3. We should recruit more foreign nationals to aid us in our programs. This activity should take the form largely of a voluntary mutual relationship, perhaps through counterparts of Communist Friendship and Solidarity Associations. So far as possible we should work in cooperation with our Atlantic partners. Ample governmental funds, in some cases lightly camouflaged through foundations, should be available for organizing meetings and conferences, conducting training seminars, establishing research institutes, and exhibitions. Honorary awards - an American Nobel Prize - might be granted to leaders in cultural and political fields.

B. The Promotion of Free World Stability - Political

We have above briefly reviewed the crisis of Communism and the measure of stabilization which it has achieved. In the eyes of the Communists, the Free World has its own crisis, now and in the future, resulting from the "contradictions" within and among capitalist-imperialist nations, chiefly the class struggle. That their Leninist analysis has some relevance to the present Free World situation may well be conceded. The problem is to create stability on our side from which to conduct the "struggle" of "peaceful coexistence."


1. The United States Government should undertake a major campaign to promote constitutional stability throughout the Free World. This should be a multi-pronged operation, involving branches of government, private institutions and individuals from a variety of fields and disciplines. It should be governed throughout by a lively concern to avoid all appearance of American intervention. (One aspect of

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such a program has been set forth in an SRS study dated 18 November 1957: The Promotion of Constitutional Stability in Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the Battle against Communism. CONFIDENTIAL).

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3. We should explore the possibility of creating loose federal groupings in certain areas. Following the pattern of the new Federation of Malaya, it might be possible to bring together the Saudi and Hashemite countries, with representatives of both houses alternating as nominal heads of state. Another grouping might include the Indochina countries and Thailand. Similarly Indonesia, if it survives its present crisis, might be encouraged to turn from centralism under Javanese dominance to a loose federation based on indirect election of the central authorities and representation by area rather than population, which would hinder the exploitation of the electoral system by radical parties.

4. We should draw up specific plans for stabilizing the constitutions of a number of key under-developed countries. These should be prepared by domestic and field teams of experts, and made available to the appropriate operating arms of the government. Action in support of these plans could range from the discreet provision of a political advisor for the head of state to a broad political science program of conferences, lectures, research, teaching, and other exchanges sponsored by private foundations.

5. We should recognize that in many backward countries political stability cannot be achieved without basic social and economic changes, and should work toward them. There are risks in opening doors to change, and a nice balance must be maintained between supporting a currently satisfactory but backward political order and advocating reform. The Communists are busy exhibiting a system which seems to offer order and stability while giving new social classes the fulfillment of their aspirations. With all their political experience the Western countries should have some imaginative but practical ideas to propose.

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6. We should adapt our political philosophy for "export" in competition with Communist "revolution." This is a difficult task, which can best be approached on a country by country basis, as indicated above. We must recognize that "democracy" is empty of content in most backward areas, and must be filled before it can be used. Basic concepts, such as justice, freedom and human dignity can only be shown to be universal when interpreted in concrete local terms. By making the necessary adaptations we will enrich our own comprehension of principles and imperatives which we too often take for granted.

7. We should seek active cooperation with democratic Socialist parties and governments. The negative attitude toward socialism which is prevalent in this country is based on a largely obsolete conception of the nature of the modern welfare state. The members of the Socialist International are for the most part as staunchly anti-Communist as ourselves. The Asian socialist or semi-socialist regimes, of which India and Burma are typical, can be acceptable political and economic partners. In Europe, the political alignment of most countries is gradually stabilizing between the two great forces of Christian Democracy and Social Democracy, which are taking on international significance within the framework of growing economic integration. Between these two, a "government-loyal opposition" system channels the broad currents of liberal and conservative political, social and economic thought, and provides effective isolation of Communism and right extremism. Only in France and Italy has this sound balance failed to emerge. Whole-hearted acceptance on our part of the worth of the democratic socialist forces in these two countries would go far to extinguishing the only serious threat in the West of a Communist assumption of power by "parliamentary means," i.e. the United Front.

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C. The Promotion of Free World Stability - Economic

It is in the economic field that the greatest challenge of Communism and the greatest opportunity for the United States and its Atlantic partners lie. Here we can re-establish the image of the US as a vital, adaptable, assured society. Eschewing pride, arrogance or complacency, we need to appear before the world, unafraid and confident of our principles and our achievements. Here, also, we can reinforce our own strength with that of our partners in the Atlantic Community, likewise productive, strong and capable of generous actions.

1. We must apply to our relations with the Free World our own confidence in the infinite productive capacity of the earth and of mankind. We must teach and believe that the soil and the wealth of raw materials available for exploitation are sufficient to insure the satisfaction of human needs and desires, far beyond the present level.

2. At the same time we must recognize the need for some measure of control over the explosive expansion of population, especially in the overcrowded countries of Asia. The United Nations is probably the best medium for study and planning in the demographic field. A major step has been accomplished by Japan in stabilizing its population, and China has ignored Marxist dogma in embarking on a vast program of birth control. Presumably the US can make a contribution to the scientific and educational aspects of this great undertaking.

3. We should undertake with all means at our disposal to improve the food situation throughout the world.

a. We might ask ourselves, before putting too much of our own land out of cultivation, whether it is wise to eliminate our surplus agricultural

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productivity altogether. There may be valid internal reasons for maintaining at least a sizeable potential to take care of our own steadily expanding population. And there are surely compelling reasons to provide a constant surplus and reserve of food to distribute to other less fortunate countries. Although any surplus ultimately costs the taxpayers money, it can yield an even greater return in the economic competition, on which, volens nolens, we are embarked with the USSR, not to mention its role in gratifying our naturally humane and generous motions.

b. The US should establish a "food disaster bank" with surplus reserves available to any country in distress. The normal channel would be an appeal from the head of the afflicted state to the President of the US. Communist countries should be eligible. The need would arise from natural disaster - floods, drought, hurricane. The "bank" should maintain a widely dispersed system of reserve stocks, sufficient to provide rations for, say one million people for ninety days. Distribution should be made under UN auspices, and other countries having surpluses should be invited to contribute.

4. We should greatly increase our efforts to assist countries with backward agriculture. Again, this might best be done through the United Nations in the FAO. We should send agronomists and other specialists wherever they can be used.

a. We might establish an international system of "machine tractor stations" with heavy agricultural equipment to be used on a "lend-lease" basis for opening virgin lands, developing irrigation, or providing a deep plowing of lands which have lost their fertility through prolonged shallow plowing. (This will be discussed below in connection with Communist China).

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b. We should also distribute on a grant or generous loan basis light agricultural power equipment for individual or small cooperative farms in established but backward agrarian economies.

Operational and maintenance instructors would accompany the equipment in both categories, the national origin of which would be indicated under the UN symbol.

5. We should accept as a responsibility and an opportunity the task of promoting the industrialization of backward countries. A number of basic principles should be observed.

a. Industrialization, per se, is not the answer to all the problems of the underdeveloped countries. A proper balance between agriculture, manufacture, production of raw materials, and services should be maintained, and this balance will differ for each region and country.

b. Long range planning is essential. This must be done jointly between the providers of capital investment and the recipient governments. Some countries, such as India and Burma, have shown some capacity for sound planning; others, such as Turkey, have occasionally been over-ambitious and unrealistic. Our approach should be one of balance between sympathy for their sense of urgency and firmness in our economic prudence:

c. A multiple approach is indicated. We should emphasize long term, low interest loans to governments for the creation of basic facilities: roads, communications, harbors, schools, and hospitals. Wherever possible, specific immediately productive

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investment such as manufacturing or extractive projects should be developed by private capital. This, of course, is difficult to obtain, even from the United States, because of the risks of nationalization and of the existence of more immediately profitable alternatives elsewhere. For this reason, governmental funds must also be made available in this category.

d. Regional approaches should be encouraged. The model of the Colombo Plan proves that advanced and backward countries can cooperate effectively on a regional basis.

6. A vast capital development program should be adopted by the United States Government (e. g. the Millikan-Rostow proposal). Whether the best mechanism for administering this activity would be the World Bank or some other agency, its constitution should permit flexibility, reasonable risk and terms sufficiently generous to compete with those offered by the Bloc. In line with President Eisenhower's remarks to Congress, a major effort must be made to convince the American people that public funds devoted to this endeavor are not a "give-away" but are soundly invested, both politically and economically. Repayments as well as defaults should be publicized.

7. We should sympathetically explore proposals of our NATO allies for economic development. These include the French proposals for investing the economies from potential disarmament in development projects and for establishing a "Eurafrique" program within the Western European common market or a broader NATO framework. The Pella scheme also deserves more than "agreement in principle." It is highly probable that, given encouragement by the US, most West European countries would be glad to match the generosity of the Marshall Plan and to maintain an investment level comparable to that which the US would undertake - say 1% per annum of Gross National Product.

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8. A number of regional development authorities should be established on the pattern of an international TVA. These should include

a. A Nile Valley authority including all riparian countries.

b. A Tigris-Euphrates authority, including the whole of the Fertile Crescent.

c. A Jordan River authority based on the Johnston plan - this of course presupposes some progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli problem.

d. International river basin programs in Asia: such as the Indus and the Mekong.

e. National river projects: such as the Irrawaddy and the Ganges.

Communist countries should be invited to participate in such projects and also to benefit from them.

9. Oil should likewise be subject to international authority. The Mideast and the Sahara urgently call for a mechanism which will insure equitable distribution of oil wealth among the producing and the transshipping countries. The role of the private oil companies must be regulated but not restricted to the point where they would lose incentive. Distribution patterns must be established and alternative means of shipment. Again, some measure of Communist participation should be invited.

10. We should do all in our power to expand and develop Free World Trade. The US must be willing to accept more imports and to "protect" weak industries by means other than tariffs.

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11. While avoiding "political strings," we should use our weight in all these programs to bring about necessary reforms. This calls for the highest order of insight, tact and perseverance. We are at an initial disadvantage because of Communist attacks on "imperialist controls." Their irresponsible proffers of purely "brotherly" aid increase our own responsibility. We should work toward

a. Reduction of corruption in the use of US aid. This is necessary, not merely for efficiency, but to insure that our money does not perpetuate existing social injustices.

b. Improvement in the distribution of income in newly wealthy countries. In some cases (Saudi Arabia) an anachronistic despotism abuses the riches which US and foreign enterprise have brought to the land. In others (Kuwait, Iraq) the rulers have accepted a relatively high degree of responsibility for economic development. Others (Iran) lie somewhere in between.

c. Insuring that economic development problems in backward countries without such endowments as oil be carefully balanced between agriculture and industry so that all classes of society will benefit. Land reform should be tied in with such programs wherever possible.

D. Social and Welfare Programs

1. The Free World Countries should concentrate private and governmental efforts on demographic programs. As noted above, the explosive rise in world population will, unless checked, have catastrophic consequences, especially in Asia. At the same time, it will be unwise to project too conservatively the curve of population which these areas could support, assuming massive economic development

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programs are carried out. Improvements in birth-control techniques must be accompanied by educational and propaganda campaigns.

2. Health and medical programs should be intensified. The World Health Organization should be given as much support as it can use. As the President has already done, we should continually challenge the USSR and the other Bloc countries to match our efforts in this field.

3. The Free World should establish a Council for Race Relations. This could be a mixed private and governmental body, loosely affiliated with UNESCO. It could cooperate with other international bodies in a wide variety of fields ranging from religion to sports. The US should be prepared to make major contributions of funds and personnel, and should encourage the Council to make studies and recommendations bearing on this country. (cf. Gunnar Myrdal's fundamental studies on the negro problem in the US.)

4. The refugee problem should be liquidated. The US should both appeal to other countries and take the lead in accepting hard core cases still left in Europe, and should be prepared to shoulder the bulk of the resettlement costs. The Arab refugee problem should be resolved within a broader political settlement of the Palestine question.

E. The United Nations

The US, like the USSR and the leading countries of Western Europe, is partially divided on its estimate of the United Nations. On the one hand, there is a sincere disposition to have confidence in the collective judgment and moral weight of greater and lesser nations. On the other hand, there is a natural tendency to view it in the light of Realpolitik and national interest. This duality will persist for

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the foreseeable future, but its sharpness may be reduced if the trend away from bi-polarization grows. We believe that the US, taking the lead in the Free World, should do everything within its power to strengthen the UN, at the same time recognizing that there are limits to the extent to which we can rest our security interests on it.

1. We should work for the establishment of a permanent UN military force.

2. We should channel as much as possible of our international atomic energy program through the UN. The UN should be asked to undertake an exhaustive study of the disposal of radioactive waste. Unless the latter problem is solved, the world may discover that it does not stand on the threshold of the widely heralded age of unlimited nuclear power. Moreover, the perfection of reactors and nuclear power plants on the trial and error methods of private enterprise will not provide the answers to the problem of balanced, economically competitive fuel supply; coal, oil and hydroelectric power must also be considered in long range planning.

3. The UN should also be charged with the study of radioactive fall-out, and other long range genetic problems of the nuclear age. The less advanced scientific countries should be encouraged to take part in this program, and should be given the necessary research tools to make their contribution.

4. The control of outer space should be assigned to the UN. The development of an International Law for this field might be elaborated with the assistance of the World Court and of such private organizations as the International Commission of Jurists. The Communist legal organizations should take part in this work.

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5. Antarctica should be declared to be under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. If the continent proves economically valuable, it might serve as a sort of permanent endowment to the Agency. National claims of sovereignty should be renounced by formal action in the Assembly.

6. The role of the UN in disputed areas should be extended. Trusteeships should be established wherever necessary and possible. Mediation should be strongly urged (Kashmir, Cyprus, West Irian).

7. The UN should be the principal instrument for resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This will require cooperation by the principal outside powers committed in the area, including the USSR. It is recognized that this will be no easy process, but with the economic support of the United States and the moral support of other countries it should be possible.

8. Private associations in support of the United Nations should be encouraged. The prestige of the American UN Association should be enhanced by all means at the disposal of the US government. At the same time we should avoid overselling the UN to our people and to the rest of the Free World.

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9. We should increase our research on the UN as an institution. A recently launched [REDACTED] project aims to study voting patterns and the formation of "blocs" in the UN Assembly. Such information is necessary to insure effective political action by our representatives, and to forestall Communist manipulation.

III. Exchanges

1. All forms of international exchange should be greatly increased. No distinction should be made between

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Communist, friendly and neutral exchange partners. Every instrument of government and society should be enlisted: churches, schools, institutes, women's clubs, Scouts, individual families.

2. The commitment of the US government to planning and sponsoring exchanges should be extended. Each agency concerned with this program should have adequate budget and staff provision.

3. We should make much more extensive use of non-white American citizens. Outstanding Negroes in all fields should be appealed to in terms of highest patriotism to act as our representatives; this is especially important in our official foreign services. One Marian Anderson - unfortunately there is only one - is worth a hundred Caucasians in colored areas. Nisei and Indian Americans might be specially trained for exchange missions or long term overseas activity.

4. We should increase our subsidies to all forms of cultural exchange. It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of a great American orchestra in countering the image of decadence and materialism which the Communists paint of us, and which many of our cultural exports unfortunately enhance.


5. In education we should encourage and assist the foundation of higher institutions abroad. In the more backward countries these should be designed to further our programs for constitutional stability and economic development. Emphasis should be placed on regional education; for example, a scientific and technological institute at Saigon might attract students from the entire SEA area. (This project has already been recommended by SRS and has been the subject of independent study by the Rockefeller Foundation).

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6. US government officials might participate more extensively in international scholarly meetings. This would be particularly desirable in cases where Communist Bloc representatives will be present. For the most part such participation would be in an observer capacity. It is believed that the British do this on a larger scale than we.

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7. We should enter on a quasi-official basis into the field of International Youth. It is not suggested that we emulate totalitarian youth control, but we might provide financial backing for some form of international youth meetings to rival those of the Communists. It might be possible to stage an International Festival in New York in 1959, as a challenge to the Moscow 1957 gathering. There are reports that the Communists may not hold their own festival in 1959, previously scheduled for Peking. If this is so, it suggests that they may have been somewhat disappointed in the Moscow endeavor and that we might profit by entering their game.

8. We should extend our participation in trade fairs. This activity is vigorously pushed by the Commerce Department, but is limited in budget. Moreover, it appears to be insufficiently coordinated with government propaganda and intelligence agencies. The example of the US super-market at the Belgrade Fair shows that we can make a deep appeal through the display of our remarkable distribution mechanisms.

9. We should increase the distribution at low cost of translated masterpieces of US literature. The Communists make available vast quantities of Marxist classics

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in translation at purely nominal prices, and are also disseminating carefully selected works by modern Soviet authors.

IV. U.S. Policy and Programs for the Communist Bloc

A. General

1. We should intensify all forms of research on International Communism.

2. We should especially study the problem of attacking Communist ideology within Marxist terms. The vulnerability of disciplined Marxists to attack in purely western terms is relatively low, but they are very sensitive to "contradictions" within their own system (these have been called "belly aches" by one who defected as a result of them - Wolfgang Leonhardt).

3. We might explore the possibility of adapting Communist tactics in the field of "people's diplomacy." A growing depth of experience, such as that of western delegates at the Moscow Festival and of scholars who have toured the Bloc, suggests that the "people-to-people" approach is potentially highly fruitful. This need not be confined to actual visits, but can take the form of institutional declarations and private correspondence. As Mrs. Roosevelt has said, we must get to know each other.

4. We should, wherever opportunity arises, propose humanitarian actions directed toward the Bloc. This has been attempted with some success in emergency food distribution. It might also, as suggested above, be undertaken in the form of vast projects to improve soil productivity.

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B. USSR

1. We should, at least in our overt positions, acknowledge the stability of the Soviet leadership. As suggested above, this might take the form of an invitation to Khrushchev and Bulganin to meet with President Eisenhower on a personal basis. We should refrain from speculating officially on the power struggle in the Kremlin and on possible challenges to the Communist Party's control. Even if such a challenge existed, it is not certain that it would be in our interest to encourage it, since the convulsions which would attend such a crisis as a military take-over, might well be disastrous for world peace.

2. We should give and accept peaceful competitive challenges. The International Geophysical Year, had it not been confused by Sputniks, would have provided an excellent example of constructive emulation. We might offer and accept challenges in architectural design, animal husbandry, weather control, medical research, and other fields.

3. We might propose exchange commissions of government officials and scholars to study each other's economy. This might be genuinely enlightening to the USSR and lead to a measure of detachment of the Communists from Marxist orthodoxy. We might also learn something new about ourselves.

4. We should do all in our power to encourage the demand for consumer goods in the USSR. There is an inherent interaction between the heavy industry drive, the labor incentive program and the demand for goods and services, which even the most purposeful Communist planning cannot entirely control. Again, citing the Belgrade example, we might offer the services of experts to organize supermarkets and other modern merchandising techniques in Russian cities. We might even detach Madison Avenue for a "Develop Siberia" campaign!

C. Satellites

1. We must determine and publicize our policy toward the satellites. This can probably be reduced to the formula "liberation through liberalization." We must not allow the cruel disappointment of Hungary to repeat itself, nor can we accept the permanence of the status quo.
2. We should promote closer economic relations between the Free World and the satellites. Trade controls should be reduced to the hardest core of strategic goods. ECE should be given greater support in its efforts to promote rapprochement between the two Blocs of Europe. We should broaden the flow of capital and food loans into the satellites, observing such discretion as is necessary both to avoid alarming Moscow and to prevent strengthening of the military base of the Bloc. As in the case of the USSR, we should encourage demand for, and production of, consumer goods on a larger scale.
3. We should free our propaganda of self-defeating emigré influences. We should not, however, turn either the satellite or the Soviet emigration out in the cold after the very considerable services they have rendered. We should merely recognize that many emigré leaders and organizations have been discredited, and in some cases give point to Communist charges of "counter-revolutionary" incitement.
4. We should make it plain that we do not favor a return to the earlier political, economic and social systems, except insofar as the peoples freely choose to do so. We must accept a "certain finality" in the satellite situations, even though we need not interpret this as sanctioning the continuance of Communist party dictatorship in perpetuity. We must accept the fact that some form of socialism would probably be freely chosen in most satellites.
5. We should encourage economic experimentation and "revisionism" in the satellites. We might invite

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satellite economists to confer with our own. This could be done either in conjunction with a Soviet-US exchange or separately. We might indulge in a campaign of encouragement, praising them for some of the very real economic achievements of their countries, and implying that we realize they could have done even better had they not been hobbled by Marxist dogma and by Soviet "coordination" (CEMA). We might also play up the Yugoslav "Leninist" experiments, especially the workers' councils. The fact that these are officially anathema but have nonetheless a strong appeal in the USSR should make this a divisive instrument, especially in Poland.

6. We should attempt to further Yugoslav political influence in the satellites. Thus, we might suggest Balkan federation as a consequence of a mutual troop withdrawal agreement - even though we have little confidence that either could come about. In any case, we should seek to frustrate the Kremlin's efforts to turn Tito into the "forgotten man" of Socialism. Despite persistent irritation with each other, the US and Yugoslavia will continue to have common interest in opposing Moscow's dominance of International Communism.

7. We should challenge the USSR to conduct its economic aid competition through the UN and subordinate regional organizations. Only in this way can long range, orderly development programs be sustained. The alternative is an era of economic profligacy, both on the part of givers seeking to influence and even subvert backward countries, and on the part of the receivers who quickly learn the art of "neutralist" blackmail. If we make such a challenge, we will immediately gain in stature throughout the world. If it is refused by the USSR, as seems probable, we will expose the hollowness of their claims that they seek reduction of tensions by all available means.

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8. As a concrete test, we might propose a meeting of finance and economic ministers of an underdeveloped region - Southeast Asia or Africa - with corresponding officials of NATO and the Soviet Bloc. The purpose would be to explore requirements for economic and technological aid and ways and means of administering it. If such a meeting were successful, a permanent organization might be established, perhaps under the general authority of the World Bank. This would constitute a planning as well as a funding mechanism.

D. Communist China

Our first task is to study more intensively two main problems: Peiping's relations with Moscow, and the attitude of the Chinese people to the Communist regime. Only on the basis of profound research and estimation can we proceed to the next step of determining the specifics of our policy. Nevertheless, since powerful currents are pressing us, we might speculate on policy modifications which we may be impelled or find it desirable to adopt, sooner than we had thought possible.

1. We should have a carefully worked out plan for accommodating ourselves to the mounting pressure to recognize Communist China. The primary objective should be to convert our intransigent position into an acquiescent one, without appearing discomfited.

2. We should plan to extract advantages from the inevitable admission of Communist China to the UN. These, to some extent, can be preconcerted by secret negotiations with our allies and influential neutrals such as India. So far as possible, they should be calculated to drive a wedge between China and the USSR.

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3. We should seek to establish in the minds of the Chinese people a basis for alienation from their Communist regime. It is suggested - with considerable diffidence - that this could best be accomplished by a great humanitarian program, conducted by the United Nations on a specific initiative of the US.

a. We could launch a vast campaign of agricultural development in mainland China. It would be possible to apply the farm implement program recommended above to the vast areas of loess soil which though fertile in depth have been exhausted on the surface through shallow plowing. A one-time turnover of this soil by heavy modern plows would enable traditional methods to yield much greater crops, until China is able to produce her own modern farm machinery.

b. Control and development of the Chinese rivers could be undertaken by an international agency. Here, too, we might challenge the USSR to compete in developing earth-moving machinery adequate to the great task.

c. We could assist the Chinese regime in planning ways to employ manpower released by the mechanization of the above two tasks. Pending full industrialization, special efforts will be required to occupy the vast reserve of human labor. Possibly construction programs can absorb much of the surplus, but the primary requirement will be to intensify agricultural employment and handicrafts.

4. We should gradually prepare the way for a Two-China solution, through the UN. We would have to guarantee to an independent Taiwan a full measure of material prosperity and an honorable international position as bearer

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of the finer traditions of Chinese culture. We could intensify the affinity of the Formosans for the Japanese. We should, through the UN, return the offshore islands to the authority of the mainland.

5. As a price of recognition and the assistance programs, the UN should require that Communist China cease subversive activity abroad. This should be subject to a UN control commission which would recommend suspension of the assistance programs if China were in violation of this stipulation.

6. Efforts should be made to stabilize the political position of the Overseas Chinese. In general they should be urged to take local citizenship, and for the rest to regard themselves as neither Nationalist nor Communist but as citizens of an entire region.

V. Countries Divided Between the Bloc and the Free World

The common denominator of approach to the three situations in this category should be unending agitation for free elections under UN supervision.

A. In South Korea we should gradually shift emphasis from military to economic programs. We should reduce the weight of the ROK army on the impoverished country, hoping that fear of general war will deter aggression from the North. We should demand free elections, being reasonably sure that they would go to the advantage of Seoul. It would be wise, however, to initiate a clean-up campaign with or without the assistance of Syngman Rhee.

B. In the case of Vietnam, before pressing for elections it might be wise to seek for a federation with Laos and Cambodia as mentioned above. We should make important

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investments to create in Saigon a potential capital of a restored Indochina. If progress could be made in this direction, the attraction on Hanoi might create increasing difficulty for the Communist regime and its Chinese masters.

C. All existing proposals for the reunification of Germany should be re-examined. The starting point would be to determine the strength of the pressures for reunification, beginning in the two halves of Germany itself. Similarly, we should review as objectively as possible the strength of sentiment for the NATO Alliance tie as opposed to some form of demilitarization and neutrality. Finally, we might weigh the dangers involved in accepting the Soviet challenge to let the East and West German regimes negotiate with each other. We might conclude that we could accept these risks in view of the certainty that the Soviet control of the Pankow puppet regime would be exposed; and the probability that the chasm between the regime and the people of East Germany would grow deeper and more visible. Even if the end conclusion was that there is no foreseeable alternative to the status quo, we would have strengthened the case for our policy by conducting the reappraisal. In any case we should never cease to affirm our support for Berlin as the eventual capital of Germany and our determination to protect it against all Communist harassment.

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APPENDIX

The following dissenting views have been expressed by SRS staff members:

P. 3, par. c: The Soviet educational system will undoubtedly turn out an increasing number of trained citizens. It is unlikely to produce a cultured society, in the Western sense, so long as Communism remains the ruling religion. Free inquiry in the social sciences and free expression in the arts are incompatible with the status of the Communist Party as the source of truth and the censor of all scholarly and cultural activity.

P. 9, A-2: An institutional framework for the advocacy of peace should be well organized, possibly centralized, so as to make coordinated policies and tactics possible. A dispersion of efforts would decrease effectiveness of a Western peace campaign.

P. 10, A-5: The Soviet regime almost certainly has no desire to seek its objectives "by holocaust," but this restraint derives from the fear of consequences, not scruples against employing violence. To publicly credit it with peaceful intentions would be to bestow an accolade it does not deserve and would confuse many nations as to the nature of the world struggle. Furthermore, the regime is a dictatorship which may at any time fall into the hands of a megalomaniac with a distorted notion of foreign motives and intentions.

P. 12, B-2: The wisdom of anchoring our disarmament negotiations in the UN is questionable. US policies should not be based chiefly in an organization that is as yet neither strong nor dependable.

P. 13, B-5: The US should not unilaterally stop testing nuclear weapons. While as a propaganda stunt such a move would be of considerable interest to many peoples in the world, it would not be worthwhile jeopardizing our security for propaganda reasons.

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P. 17, D-3: The possibility of inviting Khrushchev and Bulganin to Washington should be kept in mind, but unless the situation changes very radically and major agreements are reached a visit of these two in 1958 would not necessarily contribute to the establishment of world peace or to better relations between the US and the USSR.

P. 27, C-8: While the idea of developing international TVAs is good, it should be carried out only in countries where we have reason to believe:

1. That the government is stable, and

2. That such a government is not anti-US or anti-West. There is no reason to help Nasser who just recently sponsored a badly concealed international Communist meeting in Cairo and reportedly paid the greater part of the bill for the permanent establishment of a secretariat of this new Afro-Asian "Cominform."

P. 29, D-3: The establishment of a Council for Race Relations in the Free World seems pointless unless this problem can be resolved in the US. The other Free World countries have not had nearly as much trouble as we have in this field. As a matter of fact, such a Council, if established prematurely, could disseminate dangerous anti-US propaganda if race relations in the US did not radically change in the near future.

P. 31, E-7: If the UN were given principal responsibility for the resolution of the Israel-Arab conflict, there is a strong possibility that the Arab countries - with the help of the Soviet Bloc and the "neutral" nations - would have their way in either dismembering or mutilating Israel. Inasmuch as the US has officially

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supported the existence of the state of Israel, it would hardly be in our interest to let the UN do more than maintain the peace in Palestine. It probably can do no more than that, at this time.

P. 35, B-1: We can encourage the demand for consumer goods in the USSR but there is no reason why we should offer any services toward attaining this goal. If we did, and our services were accepted, the Russians would be relieved of a great responsibility and could concentrate even more on the increase of heavy industry and military equipment. On the contrary, we should keep the pot boiling by pointing out to the Russian people that the industrial and scientific achievements of the Soviet Union have been made at the cost of their living standard and let the Kremlin worry about changing this situation.

P. 36, C-2: With the possible exception of Poland, the flow of capital and food loans to the satellites should not be broadened. Even there we have to keep in mind that Poland is still part of the Soviet empire and that whatever help we give it will relieve the Soviets of responsibilities and obligations. This applies even more to the other satellites.

P. 37, C-5: While we may well invite satellite economists to confer with ours, there is no reason why we should indulge in praising them for "some of the very real economic achievements of their countries." These achievements are not so considerable as to merit our praise, and even if they were, why should we give Communist economy a pat on the back? Nor should we play up Yugoslav "Leninist" experiments. While anti-Communist propaganda in Marxian terms is recommended, it would not be wise to laud a Communist system of whatever character for creating its own organizational weapons.

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P. 38, D: There is disagreement with some of the major points of this part. Should we use the concept "accommodating to mounting pressure" for a recognition of Communist China? If we are ready to recognize Communist China we will do it on our own account and for reasons of US security and welfare. There is little doubt that eventually it will be in our interest to recognize Communist China so as to have a better opportunity of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union. Moreover, we should not help Communist China in agricultural development, flood control, and manpower planning, and thereby relieve the Chinese Communist government as well as the Kremlin of the obligation to cope with these problems. We can do this sort of thing only after we have ascertained with reasonable certainty that a rift is developing and growing between the two Communist countries. For the time being, Communist China is absolutely dependent, militarily and industrially, on Soviet help and under those circumstances rifts will not be permitted to develop in China where they are bound to arise at a later period. It should not be forgotten that the revolutionary fervor of the ruling party in Communist China is still very young and strong, and that the men of Peiping would almost certainly not give up one inch of sovereignty by submitting to a program of control of propaganda and subversive activity. China was for a long time a semi-colonial power, and it must be assumed that vast numbers of Chinese who are not necessarily Communists accept their present government because it has freed them from colonial controls. As to whether the US can do anything to influence the political position of Overseas Chinese, this is extremely doubtful.

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